VOTER ROLLS BEHIND A DIGITAL VEIL: ELECTION COMMISSION WITHHOLDS SIR SOFTWARE DETAILS, INVOKES TRADE SECRETS
October 26, 2026
The Election Commission of India has refused to disclose the name and version of the software used to identify errors and anomalies in electoral rolls during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), citing commercial confidence, trade secrets and intellectual property rights. The decision has intensified questions over transparency, technological accountability and the safeguards protecting citizens’ voting rights during an exercise that can determine whether an individual’s name remains on the electoral register.
In a response dated October 16 to a Right to Information application, the poll panel declined to provide the requested software details, invoking exemptions under the Right to Information Act, 2005. The disclosure controversy comes amid continuing political disagreements over the conduct of the SIR, with opposition parties questioning the technology and procedures used to identify inconsistencies in voter records.
The Election Commission maintained that no new software had been developed or procured specifically for the SIR exercise. It also stated that decisions concerning the inclusion or exclusion of individual electors were taken by Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) on the basis of facts and records. However, the response did not identify the software used to detect discrepancies or explain in detail how potentially problematic records were identified and subsequently examined.
The RTI application was filed on July 27 by M. A. Mujeeb Ayyub, a social activist from Telangana. He sought information about the digital systems used to detect errors, anomalies and inconsistencies in electoral rolls, including whether artificial intelligence or other automated technologies played a role in the revision process.
Among the questions raised was whether the Commission used a particular software application, algorithm or artificial intelligence platform to flag voter records for verification, correction or deletion. The applicant also sought information about the procedures followed after records were flagged and the safeguards designed to prevent genuine voters from being incorrectly identified as having discrepancies in their records.
The application further sought to establish whether artificial intelligence, machine learning, predictive analytics or automated decision-support systems were used at any stage of the exercise. These questions are significant because the identification of discrepancies in large electoral databases can involve automated comparisons, but the use of such tools does not, by itself, establish that a final decision about a voter is made automatically.
The Commission declined to disclose the software’s name and version, citing the exemption under Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI Act, which concerns information involving commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property where disclosure could harm a third party’s competitive position.
On questions concerning automated flagging, the use of artificial intelligence and the workflow followed after anomalies were identified, the Commission said that the information sought amounted to a request for clarification that did not fall within the definition of information under Section 2(f) of the Act.
The response also invoked Section 8(1)(g) in relation to a question about the authority responsible for reviewing flagged anomalies, citing the provision concerning information whose disclosure could endanger a person’s life or physical safety or reveal confidential sources of information provided for law-enforcement or security purposes.
The Commission reiterated that the Electoral Registration Officer of the relevant Assembly constituency is the statutory authority responsible for preparing and revising the electoral roll. It referred to Sections 13B(1) and 13B(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, in explaining the role of these officials.
The distinction between software-assisted identification and statutory decision-making is central to the controversy. The Commission’s stated position is that EROs decide whether an elector should be included in or excluded from the roll on the basis of facts and records. Yet questions remain about the technological process that may precede those decisions, the criteria used to identify discrepancies and the procedures available to challenge erroneous flags or incorrect entries.
An automated system can help officials identify duplicate records, inconsistencies or other irregularities across large databases. Such systems can also produce false positives, particularly when records contain spelling variations, incomplete information, inconsistent formatting or other discrepancies that do not necessarily indicate wrongdoing. Transparency about the methods used, the limits of the technology and the human review process can therefore be important to public confidence in electoral administration.
The Commission’s refusal to provide the requested details does not establish that the software was used to manipulate voter rolls, nor does the absence of disclosure establish that the technology operated without adequate safeguards. However, the unanswered questions have become a point of contention because the SIR process affects the preparation of electoral rolls and, consequently, citizens’ ability to exercise their franchise.
The controversy has also drawn criticism from the Congress. Party leaders have questioned the Commission’s reluctance to disclose information about its digital systems, including ECINET, and have alleged that the lack of transparency raises concerns about the integrity of the revision process. Congress general secretary Jairam Ramesh has argued that withholding information about the software and the possible use of artificial intelligence undermines public confidence. These remain allegations made by the opposition and should be distinguished from findings established through an independent investigation.
The disagreement reflects a broader debate over the balance between protecting legitimate commercial or security interests and ensuring accountability in public institutions. While the RTI Act provides exemptions for certain categories of information, the application of those exemptions can itself become a subject of scrutiny, particularly when the information sought relates to the administration of a fundamental democratic process.
The Commission’s position also raises a practical question: how can citizens and political parties independently assess the reliability of a system if the technical methods used to identify electoral discrepancies are not disclosed? Detailed disclosure of proprietary source code may not always be necessary or appropriate, but meaningful transparency can include explanations of system functionality, the categories of discrepancies detected, the safeguards against errors, audit procedures and the mechanisms through which affected voters can seek correction.
The responsibility of the EROs remains particularly important. If software identifies a possible anomaly, the process must distinguish between a signal requiring further examination and evidence justifying a change to an elector’s record. The availability of documentary verification, reasoned decisions and accessible appeal mechanisms is essential to preventing technical discrepancies from becoming grounds for unjustified exclusion.
The episode comes against a background of sustained disputes over the SIR and its implementation. Political parties and civil-society voices have raised concerns about the scale and pace of electoral-roll revisions, while the Commission has maintained that the exercise is intended to improve the accuracy of voter lists. Resolving such disagreements requires more than competing assertions: it requires verifiable information about procedures, transparent explanations of decisions and effective avenues for addressing errors.
The RTI response has not answered all the questions put to the Commission. In particular, the applicant’s queries about the precise software used, the role of automated systems, the safeguards against false positives and the process for reviewing flagged records remain unresolved in the public account of the response.
For an institution responsible for conducting elections and maintaining electoral rolls, public trust depends not only on the formal authority of its officers but also on confidence that the underlying systems are reliable, fair and subject to appropriate oversight. Protecting intellectual property and legitimate security interests can be compatible with public accountability, provided that the exemptions do not leave essential questions about the exercise of statutory power unanswered.
The controversy ultimately centres on a basic democratic principle: every eligible citizen must have a fair opportunity to remain on the electoral roll, and every decision affecting that right must be supported by a lawful and reviewable process. The Election Commission has reiterated that EROs make inclusion and exclusion decisions on the basis of facts and records. The continuing demand for greater clarity concerns how the digital systems support those decisions and what safeguards ensure that genuine voters are not wrongly affected.
Until these questions receive clearer answers, the dispute over the SIR software is likely to remain part of the wider debate over electoral transparency, administrative accountability and the protection of voting rights in India
